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Much economic, political, judicial and legal attention has been
showered on the significant changes currently taking place
within the music production and distribution business forced by
the use of the Internet for both file sharing (of unauthorized
copyrighted material) and more recent online (legal) music dis-
tribution. The strong demand for music, coupled with the low
cost of distributing illegal copies via peer-to-peer (P2P) systems,
is unraveling the business model by which music has tradition-
ally been created, developed, and distributed. Application of
traditional copyright law has been ineffective in stopping the
loss of business in the traditional channels. Producers have im-
plemented forms of Digital Rights Management ("DRM") in an
attempt to protect their property via technologically self-
enforcing contracts. Past DRM efforts have alienated customers,
resulted in defective products, and, in some cases, been laugha-
bly easy to defeat by "hackers." Producers assert that if the
problem isn't solved, music production will be sharply curtailed.
The cost of "free" music via P2P is less music produced and
fewer choices, an outcome that all seem to agree is bad. In this
Article, I attempt to answer the question whether or not a reduc-
tion in music choice is, in fact, bad. I model the music industry
as a Hotelling-Salop differentiated products market and, using
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vania. The research reported in this Article was undertaken while visiting University of
Pennsylvania Law School. I am indebted to Professors Polk Wagner, Gideon Parchamovsky
and Chris Sanchirico of Penn Law. Professor Joel Waldfogel provided help in assessing the
relevant literature. My conversations with Professor Molly Van Houweling formerly of the
University of Michigan Law School focused my attention on this problem. I am also indebted
to participants at Penn Law's Ad Hoc Summer Workshop, July 19, 2005, Wharton's Applied
Economics Workshop, August 10, 2005, Kennedy School's New Directions in Regulation
Seminar, October 20, 2005, and Wharton's Colloquium on Media Law, October 28, 2005. Dr.
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results from Bhaskar and To,' I show that significant overpro-
duction of music may occur The worst hypothesized loss from
file sharing tends to reduce this overproduction, but does not
eliminate it. Applying effective DRM simply returns the market
to overproduction. Taking account of potential externalities (us-
ing rough preliminary estimates) of creative material suggests
that overproduction of music is still the most likely outcome.
Further empirical research is needed, but, on the basis of this
model, the most likely outcome is that the displacement of CD
sales by P2P file sharing actually increases welfare by con-
straining the overproduction of music that results from its unique
market structure. The very tentative policy conclusion is that le-
gitimizing file sharing under the doctrine of fair use is likely to
be welfare enhancing.
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INTRODUCTION
The music business is in turmoil today; the traditional business
model of the industry is being undermined by file sharing of copyrighted
material over the Internet using peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. The re-
cording industry claims that file sharing has led to substantial losses in
their traditional market of CD sales and has attempted to stem this loss
1. V. Bhaskar & Ted To, Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis
of Free Entry, 35 (4) RAND J. EcON., 762, 764-65 (2004).
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by both legal and technological means.2 They claim that if performing,
producing, and distributing music becomes less profitable due to P2P file
sharing, then less music will be produced.'
The threat of a copyright lawsuit has been ineffective against P2P
file sharing. To preserve their rights in the absence of a lawsuit, the in-
dustry has started to use software locks embedded in their products to
prevent or limit copying. The initial deployment of this Digital Rights
Management (DRM) went very badly for producers and customers
• 4
alike. More recent evidence from the market, however, suggests that the
latest forms of DRM are gaining substantial customer acceptance, al-
though are still not without problems.'
If P2P is a genuine threat to the profits of artists and producers, less
music will be performed, produced, and distributed, which has been gen-
erally presumed to constitute a net social loSS.6 Ultimately, the P2P
controversy is actually a debate about the appropriate level of music
production. Several previous economic studies have focused on the ex-
tent to which file sharing has impacted CD sales and industry profits.
Other studies have focused on the extent to which DRM can recoup such
sales without imposing substantial costs on customers.
In this Article, I model the music market as a differentiated products
market, reconciling the obvious abundance of music in the market with
copyright's grant of a monopoly to the artist/producer. Such models have
a rich history in economics, beginning with Hotelling's well-known pa-
per in location theory I use recent results8 applied to the music industry
to show that we should expect substantial excess entry into the music
market (and differentiated product markets in general). For a wide range
of plausible parameters, entry in equilibrium exceeds efficient entry by
40-60%. File sharing reduces industry profits and therefore reduces
2. Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, An Economist's Guide to Digital Music 43, 45
(CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1333, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=628961.
3. Advocates of file sharing do not accept this argument; they contend that file sharing
is likely to increase music production as an alternative music distribution channel and a means
by which customers can sample unpublicized artists. See Tim O'Reilly, Piracy is Progressive
Taxation, and Other Thoughts on the Evolution of Online Distribution, OPENP2P.coM, Dec.
11, 2002, http://www.openp2p.com/lpt/a/3015.
4. See EFF.com, Digital Rights Management and Copy Protection Schemes,
http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
5. See Wikipedia, FairPlay, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FairPlay (last visited Oct. 6,
2006) (explaining the Apple iPod DRM "Fairplay").
6. There is growing literature on the estimation of the loss of CD sales due to file
sharing. See Stan Leibowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction? 49
J.L. & EcON. 1 (2006) (citing many recent articles). The unstated assumption of this literature
is that a loss of music sales is welfare-decreasing, presumably because a competitive market in
(protected) music must be producing the optimum amount of music.
7. Harold Hotelling, Stability and Competition, 34 EcON. J. 39, 41-57 (1929).
8. Bhaskar & To, supra note 1.
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entry, but even using the very high estimates of P2P displacement of CD
sales claimed by the recording industry, there is still overproduction.
Intellectual property can also generate spillovers. Wagner plausibly
asserts that such spillovers exist in the creative works, such as music and
movies.9 If present, such spillovers would ceteris paribus lead to under-
production. Depending on the magnitude of such spillovers, private
excess entry may in fact be socially optimal when the incentive for un-
derproduction in the presence of spillovers is accounted for. No
measures of this spillover currently exist; I propose plausible bounds on
the size of these spillovers based on other work. I find that, taking all
factors into account, overproduction or underproduction are both possi-
ble. The most important factors in determining which outcome occurs
are (i) the shape of customer preferences; and (ii) the size of the spill-
over. Losses of CD sales to P2P file sharing and the effectiveness of
DRM have relatively smaller effects. It is unfortunate that the least im-
portant factors are the easiest to measure and have attracted the most
economic research. The more important factors constitute a substantial
measurement challenge for empirical work.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Traditionally, the music business encoded its product on a physical
medium, such as a vinyl record, magnetic tape, or CD and sold the
physical medium through stores and other retail outlets. Their product
was protected by copyright, which governed the relations among artists,
producers, distributors, radio stations, jukebox operators, and other con-
sumers of music. Customers listened to the music on devices sold
separately, and occasionally copied the music (say, tape-to-tape copying)
for personal or family use. However, mass copying was much too costly
for customers, and so copyright enforcement at the customer level was
not necessary to protect the economic interests of the artists and industry.
The advent of the Internet and P2P networks changed this stable
situation dramatically. In 1999, Napster was invented and deployed over
the Internet by Shawn Fanning.' ° The service consisted of a program that
could be downloaded and executed on a personal computer (the "client"
computer) connected to the Napster servers via the Internet." The pro-
gram cataloged the music files on the client computer (at the direction of
the computer's owner) and transmitted the information to Napster's serv-
9. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the My-
thologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1009 (2003).
10. Peitz & Wallbroek, supra note 2, at 42.
11. See generally, id.
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ers where the information was cataloged. Any Napster customer inter-
ested in acquiring a music file could query Napster's servers for the
location of the music on other computers, connect to a computer with the
file, and download the music to her own machine. Computer owners who
"ripped" music from a CD to their computer could thus share the CD
with the entire Napster community. The availability of free music at-
tracted an enormous customer base, especially among high school and
college students, and trading of copyrighted music soared.'"
Napster did not keep copyrighted music on its servers; it merely
helped customers find the music they were looking for. They hoped to
avoid prosecution as a copyright infringer by claiming that it was the
customers who shared the material, and not Napster itself.13 Of course,
the cost of bringing copyright enforcement actions against the millions
of individual Napster users was prohibitively large. Instead, music pro-
ducers targeted Napster itself as a copyright infringer. Napster was sued
successfully, and shut down in 2001.
After Napster was shut down, new firms sprang up, such as Grok-
ster, KaZaA, and Morpheus, offering similar services. 4 A key difference
was that these services did not depend on a central server; their programs
ran on client computers. When a customer wished to download a specific
music file, her request went over the Internet to whichever computers
were nearby (in cyberspace) running the same program.' 5 The suppliers
of these new programs thought that the absence of a central server meant
there would be no copyright liability. They were also physically located
outside the U.S., and operated by distributing their product over the
Internet. Grokster was recently sued by MGM and others for facilitating
copyright infringement and, despite the absence of a central server, the
content industry won a victory at the Supreme Court.'6
A. Copyright-When Does It Work?
Copyright law is clear: individuals who are sharing files of copy-
righted music over the Internet are guilty of copyright infringement. So,
why is the law an insufficient incentive to stop file sharing of such
12. Id. at 30-31, 34.
13. Id. at 43.
14. See generally, id.
15. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2770-71
(2005), for a discussion of how these types of P2P programs work.
16. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. 2764. Grokster had been awarded summary judgment in Dis-
trict Court, upheld by the Ninth Circuit, on the basis of an earlier ruling in Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), permitting the sale of videocassette re-
corders. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case to the District
Court. While this decision is a victory for the entertainment industry, it is highly unlikely that
this will end P2P file sharing.
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material? Why does copyright infringement, which has been effective as
the legal underpinning of the music industry's traditional business
model, fail to work in a world of P2P?
The answer lies with the technology of mass distribution and the
transaction costs of copyright enforcement. In the traditional model,
copying and mass distribution was relatively expensive; only large enti-
ties could afford the costs and (possibly) turn a profit through (illegal)
sales. Copyright enforcement was a "business to business" proposition.'
7
Should a distributor, radio station, or other producer illegally distribute
another producer's copyrighted material, the act was easily detected, the
infringer was easily identified, and the loss to the producer more likely
to be large enough to justify the transaction costs of an infringement suit.
The total number of potential infringers numbered perhaps in the low
hundreds. In contrast, the technology of ripping music and sharing it
over the Internet using P2P reduces the cost of copying and distribution
to near zero.'8 As a result, up to 40% of music aficionados share billions
of copyrighted songs on a regular basis. 9 While sharing may or may not
cause the recording industry economic loss, it is clear that bringing
copyright infringement suits against millions or even thousands of cus-
tomers is far too costly to be practical.
Traditionally, customer copyright infringement has been controlled
by the high costs of copying and mass distribution. Small scale copying,
while no doubt ubiquitous, posed no threat to the recording industry's
business model. Business to customer infringement enforcement was
neither necessary nor feasible. All this changed with the advent of the
Internet and P2P. With new technology, the costs of copying and distri-
bution became negligible but the costs of enforcement remained high.2°
Much recent effort by the recording industry has been focused on P2P
intermediaries, such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and the creators
of P2P client software such as Grokster and KaZaA. For example, the
RIAA successfully brought suit against Verizon Communications, forcing
Verizon to divulge the identities of KaZaA users.2' In targeting intermedi-
ary firms, rather than customers, the recording industry is attempting to
control file sharing by copyright enforcement in a business-to-business
17. This point was brought home to me in a discussion with'Fred Wilf of Morgan
Lewis, Philadelphia, PA.
18. Peitz & Waelbroeck, supra note 2, at 35.
19. Id. at 12-15. The surveys were conducted in 2003. The distribution of file sharers is
highly skewed, with a very small fraction of file sharers responsible for most activity. The age
distribution is also highly skewed toward the 18-24 year-old demographic.
20. In 2003, the recording industry launched thousands of suits against individual file
sharers, and the amount of file sharing was reported to have dropped 15-20%. Peitz & Wael-
broeck, supra note 2 at 44. However, it soon recovered to its previous level.
21. Peitz & Waelbroeck, supra note 2, at 44.
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model, rather than a business-to-customer model. Whether or not they
will be successful in this attempt is unclear as of this writing.
1. Digital Rights Management
In light of this perceived threat to its business model, the recording
industry also experimented with and deployed technological methods of
protecting their intellectual property in the form of software locks em-
bedded within the music content (either on a CD or as legally digitally
distributed over the Internet) that limit the ability of customers to copy
the music. 22 More broadly, customers were sold not only the music, but
rights to use the music. In this way, music producers sought to reduce
the losses they claimed to be suffering from P2P file sharing. Producers
believed that music protected by DRM ("DRM music") could not be
shared, and would thus protect copyrighted materials from infringement
by customers in a way that copyright law itself could not. While DRM
could be viewed as a substitute for copyright law, this argument is unper-
suasive. The practical purview of copyright law is generally business to
business relationships, where DRM has little effect. Instead, DRM is
targeted towards the business to customer relationship, where application
of copyright law is only theoretical and has no practical significance.
Thus, DRM augments, rather than displaces, copyright protection.
The initial rollout of DRM is generally regarded as a disaster. Early
versions of DRM forbade all copying, and often did not work on certain
types of devices, such as computers. On top of that, CDs that were
DRM-enabled were not labeled as such, so customers did not know what
they were buying, and retail stores often didn't know what they were
selling. When customers took their new purchase home and found that
the CD did not play on their computer, they were outraged and attempted
to return the CD to the retail store. Often, the retail outlet refused to re-
turn their money. In 2001, a significant customer backlash began, with
websites authored by outraged music fans listing albums with DRM at-
tached and urging boycotts not only of those albums but also of the
artists and producers that performed and sold them. Clearly, music fans'
expectations were not met and there was a strong negative reaction
against the industry.
It is possible that this strong negative customer reaction would have
been tolerable if the early DRM had actually controlled file sharing. Vir-
tually every DRM scheme, however, has been "cracked" by software
hackers within weeks after coming on the market. In one particularly
embarrassing incident, Sunncomm's MediaMax DRM software for mu-
sic CDs was bypassed simply by holding down the shift key on the
22. Id. at 35, 45.
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computer while loading the CD into the reader.23 The Princeton graduate
student who discovered this made the bypass known on the web and
through the news media. Sunncomm originally threatened to prosecute
the student under the DMCA, but the embarrassing publicity from the
incident proved too much, and they corrected the flaw instead. 2'
Extant economics work on the effectiveness of DRM has reflected
this experience. The level of DRM (severity vs. laxness) is traditionally
modeled as a tradeoff between protecting against illicit copying and de-
grading the product for listeners.25 In this model, stringent DRM can
limit copying only at a cost to the quality of the product itself. On the
other hand, meeting customer expectations by a more relaxed DRM
would lead to more copying. However, subsequent developments in the
market suggest that this model is inappropriate. In 2001, Apple released
the iPod and its iTunes online music store. These products have been
wildly successful, with close to 60 million iPods sold through June
2006.26 iTunes music is protected by a DRM called FairPlay. FairPlay
permits the music to be accessed on upto five computers simultaneously,
burned on an unlimited number of CDs, and downloaded onto an unlim-
ited number of iPods.27 As a result of this more relaxed DRM, customer
response to the iPod/iTunes combination has been enthusiastic, as meas-
ured by commercial success. The irate reaction of customers to early
DRM has not been repeated for iTunes. Apparently, FairPlay meets the
expectations of legitimate customers by permitting them to do what they
normally expect to be able to do.
It should be noted that FairPlay was cracked almost immediately af-
ter it came on the market.28 However, the iTunes pricing model and the
absence of constraints on legitimate customer uses have maintained the
iPod/iTunes business model in spite of cracks and file sharing. A newer
entry into Internet distribution, RealNetworks' Rhapsody service, uses a
DRM scheme similar to FairPlay. These early indicators suggest the
market will move toward DRM schemes that meet customer expectations
with no loss of value to legitimate customers but still protect against
23. See J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the MediaMax CD3 Copy-Prevention System,
(Oct. 6, 2003), http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jhalderm/cd3/ (describing the MediaMax DRM
and the simple "crack" Mr. Halderman discovered).
24. See Declan McCullagh, SunnComm Won't Sue Grad Student, CNET NEWS.COM,
Oct. 10, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5089448.html.
25. See, e.g., Arun Sundararajan, Managing Digital Piracy: Pricing and Protection, 15
INFO. Sys. RES. 287, 288 (2004) ("[Implementing effective DRM-based technological deter-
rence often necessitates a direct reduction in the value of the legal product.").
26. Wikipedia, iPod, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lPod (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
27. Wikipedia, FairPlay, supra note 5.
28. See posting of Ken "Caesar" Fisher to Ars Technica, http://arstechnica.con/news/
posts/1081206124.html (April 5, 2004, 6:02 PM) (providing details of the "PlayFair" crack for
the FairPlay DRM system).
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unlimited mass distribution. However, we can also continue to expect
that new DRM protections will be cracked, and that the decode scripts
will be available on the web.
Despite iTunes' and Rhapsody's relative success with their relaxed
DRM, music distributors continue their missteps. In 2005, Sony BMG
released a large number of music CDs containing Sunncomm XCP
DRM, which upon loading on a computer installs a rootkit into the heart
of the computer's operating system, cloaks itself so that it is virtually
impossible to remove, and opens a backdoor exploitable by viruses and
worms. 29 When the nature of the XCP DRM was revealed on a security
expert's website, there was negative publicity for Sony BMG, and they
eventually backed down, settling several lawsuits on terms favorable to
customers. ° While there is a fairly clear path to an effective and accept-
able DRM (e.g., iTunes and Rhapsody), it is apparent that it may take the
industry some time before it arrives at this endpoint.
2. Fair Use
Fair use is a legal doctrine under which copyrighted materials may
be used without permission or payment for certain restricted uses.3' One
function of fair use in music is to permit customers to make a small
number of copies for personal or family use. Since copyright is not eco-
nomically enforceable at the customer level, fair use is usefully viewed
as simply a means to decriminalize a rarely prosecuted activity (personal
copying) with little impact on the economics of the music industry. Fair
use, then, allows copyright law to conform to customer expectations.
The initial rollout of DRM violated what customers believed to be
their fair use "rights" to copy purchased music for personal use. In fact,
music sold with DRM and the accompanying end user license agreement
("EULA") constitutes a contract (the EULA) together with a mechanism
to enforce that contract (the DRM). The combination of the EULA and
an effective DRM scheme renders the music sold copyable only under
the terms of the EULA, thereby circumventing the consumer's fair use
rights. However, I argue that the fair use copying exception is irrelevant
in the long run. Far more important than fair use rights is the customer's
expectation of use. The early DRM rollout demonstrated that failing to
meet customer expectations is more likely to induce music distributors to
29. See J. Alex Halderman & Edward Felton, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode
1-2 (Princeton University, May 16, 2006), available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/
pub/sonydrm-ext.pdf.
30. See Wikipedia, 2005 Sony BMG CD copy protection scandal, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/2005_SonyCDscopy-protectioncontroversy (last visited September 21, 2006).
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. This analysis grew out of a discussion with Professor Van
Houweling on DRM and fair use.
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change their behavior than are fair use rights. In fact, there is evidence
that music producers are moving to meet consumer expectations.32 In the
long run, if effective DRM schemes are indeed possible, they must meet
customer expectations in order to survive in the marketplace. 3
B. Has File Sharing Displaced CD Sales?
At the core of the file sharing and music production problem is the
empirical issue of whether or not file sharing actually displaces CD
sales, and if so, by how much. Concern about the long-term viability of
the current music business is not misplaced. It is generally agreed that
the Hong Kong movie industry was driven out of business by wholesale
piracy of DVDs originating in Asia.4 Certainly, the economics literature
has focused on this issue, as has the industry itself. On its website, the
RIAA claims that between one-third and two-fifths of CD sales have
been displaced by illegal file downloads.35 Since the music industry has
an interest in finding a large number of illegal downloads in order to
garner support for Congressional action, we may take this number as an
upper bound on the true displacement.
Liebowitz estimates that file sharing has displaced about 20% of CD
sales, a number he describes as "not small" but unlikely to "annihilate"
the industry.36 In a more recent paper, Liebowitz adopted a more alarmist
position, indicating that old econometric studies suggest "file sharing has
brought significant harm to the recording industry."37 Although, this Arti-
cle provides no independent empirical estimate of the reduction of CD
sales due to file sharing, Peitz and Waelbroeck arrive at the same 20%
estimate, using cross-sectional evidence. Rob and Waldfogel use a sur-
vey of University of Pennsylvania students and estimate that file sharing
32. For example, the relaxed DRM in the Apple FairPlay and Rhapsody music distribu-
tion systems.
33. A DRM solution that meets customers' expectations while protecting producers'
interests is the likely outcome of any market, even one in which producers exercise market
power. Even monopolists wish to make their product as attractive as possible; annoying one's
customers simply lowers the value of the product and thus, the amount customers are willing
to pay for it.
34. See, e.g., Curtain Closes on Hong Kong's Film Industry, TAIPEI TIMES, May 6,
2005, at 17, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2005/05/06/
2003253454.
35. Recording Industry Association of America, http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/
default.asp (last visited Sep. 26, 2006).
36. Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the Music Industry? The Evidence
So Far 26-31 (Univ. of Tex. at Dallas, Working Paper, 2003), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=414162.
37. Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 24.
38. Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet Piracy on Music Sales:
Cross-Section Evidence, 1 REV. EcON. REs. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUEs, 71, 78 (2004),
http://www.serci.org/docs-1-2/waelbroeck.pdf.
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displaces about 10% of CD sales based on post-download purchase be-
havior.39 Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf look at a very large sample of
downloaded music and contemporaneous CD sales and find that
downloads have no statistically significant effect on CD sales. 4 Hong
uses the Consumer Expenditure Survey to estimate that between 33%
and 45% of the downturn in CD sales from 1999-2000 was due to Nap-
ster/file sharing.4' Since this downturn in expenditures was 9.7%, the
estimated total impact of file sharing is less than 5%. Zentner uses a
cross-section of French consumers to estimate that file sharers are 30%
less likely to buy music; his best estimate of the loss of CD sales is
7.8%.2
The empirical issue is not yet settled: even among academic research-
ers, who presumably have no financial interest in the answer, the range of
estimates of displacement in music sales is disappointingly large. Assum-
ing the loss of CD sales to P2P is in the range of 10%-20%, is this loss
"large"? For music industry executives, the loss is quite large; from a pub-
lic policy perspective, the loss appears rather modest. Indeed, from an
economist's point of view, it is surprising that that any music is sold at all.
After all, if music is available for free, why does anyone buy it?
In fact, downloading music is costly to most customers, for a variety
of reasons:
* File sharing is easier for customers with a broadband connec-
tion to the Internet. As of June, 2005, only 35% of U.S.
residential households subscribed to broadband service.43
File sharing requires a modicum of experience with a com-
puter and the Internet; it not only involves downloading the
music itself, but downloading the software, installing it, and
then burning the music to a CD. It is safe to assume that not
every member of the 35% of households with broadband has
these skills.
39. Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Dis-
placement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, 49 J.L. & ECON. 29, 30 (2006).
40. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record
Sales 3 (Univ. of N.C., Working Paper, 2004), available at http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/
FileSharing-March2004.pdf.
41. Seung-Hyun Hong, The Effect of Napster on Recorded Music Sales: Evidence from
the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 28 (Stan. Inst. Econ. Pol'y Res., Discussion Paper No. 03-
18, 2004), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/Papers/pdf/03-18.html.
42. Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the Effect of Music Downloads on Music Purchases,
49 J.L. & ECON. 63, 66 (2006) (study based on 2002 data).
43. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, HIGH SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET
ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2005 (2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-
public/attachmatch/DOC-264744A 1 .pdf
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Downloading a music file takes time, and may result in a cor-
rupted or fake file. This suggests that file sharers have a low
value of time. Consumers who value their time highly are
unlikely to have the patience for file sharing.
" There are substantial risks of viruses, worms and Trojan
horses being downloaded to a file sharer's computer, with the
attendant cost to the customer."
* Most P2P programs come with spyware included and do not
function if the spyware is removed.45 Thus, even without ac-
tual downloading, P2P software involves a loss of computer
resources from the spyware constantly running unannounced
in the background, as well as a loss of privacy.
* Some customers refuse to share music files because it is ille-
gal. Just like most hotel guests don't steal the towels (even if
they won't be caught), the relatively low cost of legitimate
downloads (e.g., from iTunes) makes theft, even if undetect-
able, unattractive to some.
File sharers have a high level of computer and Internet skills, a low
value of time, a belief that they will remain virus-free, and a somewhat
blunted sense of guilt over theft of intellectual property. It is unlikely
that this profile fits all or even most Americans, so file sharing and loss
of CD sales is likely to be bounded. The modest estimates of CD sales
displacement (10%-20%) bear out this intuition.
C. Spillovers
Intellectual property occupies a unique position in economics, law,
and policy not only for its dilemma of nonappropriability, but also for its
alleged spillovers . The lack of appropriability has led to the creation of
intellectual property laws, such as patents, trademarks, and copyright, as
a means of socially constructing appropriability. However, intellectual
property is also perceived to create spillovers: a new idea, creation, or
invention may lead others to the next new idea, creation, or invention.
44. For a list of the most prevalent worms on P2P networks in 2004, see Peitz & Wael-
broeck, supra note 2, at 11.
45. "Spyware is a general term used for software that performs certain behaviors such
as advertising, collecting personal information, or changing the configuration of your com-
puter, generally without appropriately obtaining your consent." What is Spyware?,
http://www.microsoft.com/athome/security/spyware/spywarewhat.mspx (last visited Novem-
ber 4, 2006).
46. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 1005-09.
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Wagner identifies three types of information associated with inven-
tions or creations. 7 Type 1 is the invention or creation itself: the
transistor, the movie, the song. Type 2 information is directly related ma-
terial, such as the movie characters or guitar riffs from the music. Type 3
is indirectly related material, such as the popularity of a movie about
fantastic creatures (as in Shrek) or the popularity of spoken lyrics (as in
hip-hop). Type 1 is always covered under IP law, while Type 2 may or
may not be included in IP law. Type 3 cannot be covered by IP law, and
thus constitutes what economists call a spillover, an effect of the inven-
tion or creation which benefits others48 but which cannot be captured by
the inventor/creator. The focus in this Article is on Type 3 information:
the spillover effect.
In science, the spillover from one idea to the next, from one inven-
tion to the next, has the noble provenance of Sir Isaac Newton: "If I have
seen further [than you and Descartes] it is by standing upon the shoul-
ders of giants.4 9 This quotation emphasizes not only the spillover from
one generation of scientists to the next, but also the technologically cu-
mulative nature of the spillover. What we learn from one invention
becomes the basis of the next invention; the existing technology is
"baked into" the new technology. The transistor becomes the basis of the
integrated circuit; the second is built upon the first. The recognition that
these spillovers occur and the presumption that they are significant give
rise to concerns that technology is underprovided 50 Since inventors can-
not internalize all the benefits of their invention, there is less incentive to
invent than is socially optimal. If the benefits of technological innovation
cannot be entirely captured by the innovator, there will be less than op-
timal resources devoted to invention.
This has led to efforts by successive generations of economists to
measure this spillover. Early work by Jaffe" and Bernstein and Nadiri
52
was summed and generalized by Griliches, who estimated that the
47. Id.
48. A creative work may also result in negative spillovers if it hurts others. For exam-
ple, it could incite people to riot, foster ethnic hatred, or be perceived as blasphemous by a
religion.
49. Newton made this comment regarding the importance of the work of his predeces-
sors in his own discoveries. See THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS (1996),
http://www.bartleby.com/66/18/41418.html (quoting Newton's letter to Robert Hooke, Feb. 5,
1675).
50. See generally Nick Bloom et al., Identifying Technological Spillovers and Product
Market Rivalry, LSE RES. ONLINE (2005), http://epfints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000780.
51. Adam B. Jaffe, Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R & D: Evidence from
Firms'Patents, Profits, and Market Value, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 984 (1986).
52. Jeffrey I. Bernstein & M. Ishaq Nadiri, Research and Development and Intra-
industry Spillovers: An Empirical Application of Dynamic Duality, 56 REV. ECON. STUD. 249
(1989).
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spillover from (patent-producing) R&D was between 0.5 and 1.5 of the
private benefit." The most recent work by Bloom, Schankerman and van
Reenen estimates this spillover at 2.5 times the private benefit of the
R&D, after correcting for the impact of the R&D on product market ri-
valry.- Clearly, the magnitude of these spillovers is substantial.
In contrast to the attention paid in the economics literature to techno-
logical spillovers, there is little work estimating the impact of spillovers
in the creative arts. Wagner suggests that spillovers are present in both
creative works and in technological invention." For example, the success
of the movie Gone with the Wind revealed a preference among moviego-
ers for romantic movies set during a historical war. The success of the
first Survivor television show suggested that "reality-based" television
would garner large audiences, spawning a host of imitator shows. While
the copyright holder to the original Survivor show had the exclusive right
to make follow-on shows, he did not have the right to block other pro-
ducers from airing The Amazing Race, Big Brother, or any other
television show that made use of the idea of "reality-based" entertain-
ment. The creators of the original show were thus unable to capture the
full social benefit of their creation; this is a case of true spillovers.56
These examples suggest that spillovers in the creative arts are preference
revealing rather than cumulative, as they are in science and technology.
This suggests that spillovers in the creative arts have a more limited im-
pact than in science and technology.57 The fact that such spillovers have
not been estimated necessitates an educated guess that the value of crea-
tive spillovers is likely at the low end of the estimates for technology
spillovers.
53. Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spilovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. (Sup-
plement) S29, S43-S44 (1992).
54. Bloom et al., supra note 50, at 25.
55. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 1005-09.
56. While the creators of Survivor can capture the direct value of the TV show and its
characters via copyright, they are not able to protect the idea of a reality TV show; copyright
protection does not extend to cover all similar programs. However, the idea of a reality TV
show generates social benefits because other reality-based shows create social value that the
original creators of Survivor cannot capture.
57. This is merely a first approximation. In fact, there are a number of examples in
which spillovers in the creative arts are cumulative. In animated films, the works of Dream-
works (MADAGASCAR (Dreamworks SKG 2005) and SHREK (Dreamworks SKG 2001)), Pixar
Studios (FINDING NEMO (Pixar Animation Studios 2003) and THE INCREDIBLES (Pixar Anima-
tion Studios 2004)), and Miyazaki (SPIRITED AWAY (Studio Ghibli 2001)) clearly influence
each other, and in turn are influenced by the earlier works of Disney (SNOW WHITE (Walt
Disney Productions 1939) and STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney Productions 1928)).
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D. What Is the Problem and Why Do We Care?
File sharing and DRM have welfare impacts beyond the financial
health of music producers and artists. If the only issue was that techno-
logical change in the form of the Internet and P2P was driving a
restructuring of the music business, it would hardly be cause for more
general concern. However, there are also potential welfare effects. Rob
and Waldfogel estimate the welfare gains and losses associated with file
sharing. 8 They note that the marginal cost of music is effectively zero,59
and find a net gain in social welfare from file sharing.60 However, they do
not account for the potential welfare impact of possible reductions in the
amount of music produced, including direct welfare losses due to less
music and indirect losses due to reduced spillovers.6'
In this Article, I focus exclusively on the issue of the amount of mu-
sic produced. This issue appears to be the core welfare issue and the
reason we care about file sharing and DRM. In a pre-file-sharing market,
is the privately efficient level of music being produced? Does file sharing
(as modified by DRM) reduce or increase the efficiency of this market?
Normally, we would expect that the presence of spillovers would ceteris
paribus lead to underproduction; does this occur in the music market?
Does file sharing/DRM exacerbate this problem? The focus of this
model, then, is to determine both the private and social efficiency of mu-
sic production, with and without file sharing/DRM, to determine the
benefits and costs of file sharing/DRM.
I draw a sharp distinction between music performed, produced, and
distributed by artists who wish only to have their music heard by others
with no thought of immediate financial reward (independent music), and
music performed, produced, and distributed for financial reward (popular
music). Artists performing independent music are doing it for "love,"
and the actual production of the music is a benefit, not a cost. Artists
(and other actors in the music business) producing popular music are
doing it to make money, and the production, marketing, and distribution
of this music is both risky and costly. This Article focuses exclusively on
popular music, which can be analyzed as a market for services that are
costly to produce and are bought and sold. This analysis has no rele-
vance to music produced for "love."
58. Rob & Waldfogel, supra note 39, at 36.
59. Id. at 36.
60. Id. at 60.
61. Id. at 33.
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In Section 3, I develop a simplified model of the music market6' as
a differentiated products market. Using recent results from Bhaskar and
To, 63 I show that the traditional market for music is likely to produce
too much music. File sharing (at least in the range of current empirical
results) reduces the amount of music produced relative to the privately
efficient level, but there is still excess entry. Deployment of "reason-
able" DRM simply increases this excess capacity. Using very rough
estimates of the size of the spillovers from music production, I com-
pare the equilibrium level of music production to the socially efficient
level. Spillovers leads to less overproduction and, for certain parameter
values, even underproduction (the usual result with spillovers). Even
accounting for spillovers, however, the likely result is overproduction.
Section 4 covers the caveats, exceptions, and simplifications of the
model. Section 5 summarizes this Article and includes some very tenta-
tive policy conclusions.
II. THE MODEL
I assume that the market for music consists of a continuum of poten-
tial customers uniformly distributed over a single dimensional product
space (unit interval) according to their musical tastes. Each customer t (0
t _ 1) has a preferred type of music, corresponding to her location on
the unit interval; consuming a unit of her preferred music yields a com-
mon utility level of U. Consuming music of another type x yields a
common utility level U -ftit-xI), f(0) = 0, f'>O. The function f is often
referred to as the "transport" function, following Hotelling's original
formulation6 of this problem as a location model.65
Modeling customer preferences for music in a spatial model imposes
strict limitations on the structure of demand. One could, for example, use
a more classical demand formulation, in which the demand vector (in-
cluding all n artists) is a function of the price vector (including all n
artists): q = Q(p), which places no prior restrictions on demand. In
music, however, we know that most of the demand interactions (cross-
62. I specifically do not model the music industry; this is a complex industry with at-
tributes of venture capitalists picking "stars," very intense marketing and merchandising, and
difficult contractual issues with its artists. My focus in this Article is how the consumer market
works; the music industry is presumed to produce artists and their copyrighted material, which
it introduces into a differentiated product market to end consumers.
63. Bhaskar & To, supra note 1, at 763.
64. Hotelling, supra note 7, at 46-47.
65. This is not the first Article to suggest that viewing music as a differentiated product
market is a useful idea; see Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004) (describing the applicability of the model to copyright issues).
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partials) among pairs of artists are zero; Britney Spears does not com-
pete with the Philadelphia Orchestra which does not compete with Garth
Brooks, etc. Imposing a spatial model on demand focuses attention on
competition among artists that are similarly located in product space,
and therefore vying for the same music customers. Whether or not this is
a reasonable model for the music market is a matter of modeling taste,
and ultimately of whether or not it explains the observed facts. In addi-
tion, the use of a spatial model forces attention to the issues of entry and
location. The central questions of spatial models are where artists locate
and how many artists enter, and this endogenous entry is at the core of
the question of this Article.
The unit of production is the artist; music producers introduce artists
at specific points in the unit interval product space; introduction involves
fixed costs. An artist is conceived as a bundle of services and products;
66
although I do not explicitly include time in the model, it is useful to
think of the artist producing a stream of services over time. Since there
are fixed costs to entry, there will be a finite number of artists, which we
assume indexed by their location a, {a = 1,2, .. . ,n} in the interval [0,1].
Consumers choose an artist to consume that generates the most net value
for them: if artist a charges customer t a price p.,, then customer t will
select the artist a(t) that maximizes U- f(It-al)-pa,. Let a'(t) be the artist
preferred second by customer t. I assume free entry, and that an artist is
able to change her location in the interval in response to changing mar-
ket conditions.
The various services offered by artists include CDs, concerts, T-
shirts, coffee mugs, fan clubs, memorabilia, etc., which I assume can be
supplied at a marginal cost of zero. These services permit artists to price
discriminate among customers by intensity of preference (relative to the
customer's next best alternative). Ardent fans buy all the services of the
artist, more relaxed fans might only buy a CD from the remainder bin at
Wal-Mart. I assume this price discrimination captures the entire available
surplus.67 I argue in Appendix B why this assumption is likely to be ap-
proximately true, based on the rather unique characteristics of the
industry.
66. I use the term "artist" to include not only the actual performer but also the entire
music industry that provides market services for that artist: actual CD production, marketing
music via radio play and advertising, distribution of product either through stores or electroni-
cally, managers, concert venue owners, and providers of financing services. Clearly, the music
industry has a very rich and complex structure; it is not my intent to model this industry in this
Article.
67. Online music distribution is likely to substantially increase the ability of music
producers and online retailers to price discriminate.
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In equilibrium, artists will be equally spaced in the unit interval; art-
ists will enter until entry profits are zero. Customers will buy from the
artist nearest them in product space; each customer is charged the differ-
ence in value between her preferred artist and her second-preferred
artist: p., =flt-a'(t)-flt-a(t)1).68
The spatial model of this Article is highly simplified for analytic
ease; it is intended as suggestive rather than definitive. Bhaskar and To
use a similar simple model to illustrate their more general model and
general results, which I discuss at length below. 69 The simpler model
fixes ideas, frames questions, and illustrates results; its purpose is to mo-
tivate deeper theoretical and empirical research. My exposition here is
primarily graphical; derivations of some of the results of this simple
model are contained in Appendix A.70
It is helpful to adopt the power function f(x) = 8.x' , 8 >0, 0>0 as a
rather general parametric form for the transport function, which I do for
the remainder of this Article. For a > 1, utility is concave, or "broad";
music in the neighborhood of a customer's preferred music is valued
almost as highly as the preferred music, dropping off more steeply with
increasing distance. For a< 1, utility is convex, or "sharp"; music in the
neighborhood of a customer's preferred music is disdained by the cus-
tomer. For a = 1, utility is linear, dropping off at a constant rate the




Linear a = 1 Broad"o .1 "Sharp" a 1
CustomerA Utility CustomerA Utility CustornerA
1 0 Music Product Space 0 Music Product Space 1
Sweet Nasty Sweet Nasty Sweet Nasty
By way of example, "sharp" preferences would correspond to cus-
tomers enjoying one artist only, with little interest in other artists, even if
68. See generally Bhaskar & To, supra note I (discussing equilibrium and space); see
also, Jean Gabszewicz & Jacques-Francoise Thisse, Location, in I HANDBOOK OF GAME THE-
ORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 294-98 (Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart eds., 1992).
69. Bhaskar & To, supra note 1, at 764-766.
70. For more formal proofs in the general model, see id.
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quite similar. For example, a pop music customer may only enjoy listen-
ing to Christina Aguilera and not be at all interested in singers of a
similar genre. "Broad" preferences would correspond to customers en-
joying a number of artists within a genre, perhaps preferring one specific
artist, but deriving value from similar artists. For example, a pop music
customer may have a preference for Christina Aguilera, but derive al-
most as much value from listening to Britney Spears or Avril Lavigne,
two artists who are similar to Aguilera, but with distinctive styles and
personalities.
In equilibrium, artists are equally spaced in [0,1] and are able to
price discriminate. The result is illustrated below, with three artists as-
sumed (and linear utility):
FIGURE 2
ARTIST LOCATION AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION





Sweet TR's Market Nasty
In Appendix A, I derive the market equilibrium number of artists un-
der conditions of free entry. This derivation depends upon the value and
shape of the transport function and the cost of artist entry. I also derive
the welfare maximizing number of artists, which also depends upon the
same parameters. As it turns out, the equilibrium number of artists n* is
not equal to the welfare maximizing number h ; the ratio of the two is
Equation (5) from Appendix A:
-2-=2C 2  a
n 21-2c
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where a is the shape parameter of the transport function. As an em-
pirical matter, a is not known; however, for all a the ratio is greater than
unity. In the linear case, a= I and the ratio n*/h = -2 = 1.414, so that in
equilibrium there is over 40% excess entry. The chart below displays this











0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Exponent of Transport Function
In equilibrium, pricing, consumption, and location is efficient; it is
only entry that is inefficiently excessive.
A. Intuition and Generalizability
The intuition for this result can be seen as follows. Begin with a
small number of artists: say, five, arranged optimally in product space.
Consider an artist that wishes to enter; she chooses a location in product
space, thereby generating value for customers at or near that location.
Additionally, other artists will be obliged to accommodate her entry (it is
optimal for them to do so), reducing profits for the five incumbent art-
ists. The addition of the sixth artist increases the total value of the
industry, but decreases the profits of incumbents. The entrant is able to
capture (via price discrimination) all the value she creates, plus the lost
profits of the incumbents. Her prospective profits are greater than the
value she creates, and therefore the incentives to enter are excessive. If
the market equilibrium number of artists is, say, one hundred, then the
one hundredth artist to enter realizes zero profits (this is the defining
property of the equilibrium number of artists) and therefore must gener-
File Shariig, Copyright
ate a loss in total net value (i.e., value to customers less cost of entry).
This result is quite similar to the well-known congestion externality:
when a driver enters a crowded highway, she makes the entry decision
based on the observed congestion and its cost to her. However, she does
not include in that calculation the congestion cost she imposes on others
on the highway. As a result, private incentives create too much conges-
tion and excess entry.
The simplicity of this model belies the generality of the Bhaskar-To
model. In their general model:
1. The product space can be of arbitrary dimension, rather than
the single dimension of the simple model.
2. Each customer can buy more than one unit, rather than the
single unit of the simple model.
3. There can be many customers at each point, rather than the
single customer of the simple model.
4. Customers can have a preference for variety, so they purchase
the music of more than one artist, rather than the single pur-
chase of the simple model.
In this general model, pricing, consumption, and location are efficient,
but there is excess entry. The key results generalize to this richer model.7'
However, as with the simple model, the result depends on three key as-
sumptions:
1. Free entry. The apparently unending flow of new artists into
the music market would appear to support this assumption.
Clearly, there is a fixed cost to entry, but any artist willing to
pay this fixed cost can enter.
2. There is no cost for artists to change location in response to
market conditions. This assumption would seem close to the
facts, as Madonna's constant reinvention confirms.
3. Artists can perfectly price discriminate. This is clearly wrong
if the unit of analysis is the CD. But it appears closer to how
the market functions; both fans and recording firms focus on
the artist and her stream of services and complementary prod-
ucts. This stream yields a rich source of rent extraction from
more and less faithful fans. In Appendix B, I show that with a
small number of complementary products (beyond the music
71. There are a number of assumptions that are common to all spatial models, and de-
serve mention here: customers are uniformly distributed throughout product space; customer
preferences are identical up to their location, and customer preferences are symmetric.
Fall 2006]
98 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 13:77
CD itself), this method of approximating perfect price dis-
crimination is very good. Since we actually observe many
such complementary products being offered under artists'
names in practice, it is safe to assume that price discrimina-
tion is both an accurate and a robust model of actual market
behavior.
These results are quite surprising, as economists assumed the last
word on this issue was from the influential work of Michael Spence:
"... if sellers can price discriminate in an appropriate sense, the welfare
aspects of the product choice problem are eliminated."" It is also surpris-
ing that the computed excess capacity is so flat over a wide range of the
shape parameter a." This suggests that excess capacity is buried quite
deeply into the structure of differentiated product markets.
B. What About File Sharing and DRM?
The result of excess capacity given by this model completely re-
verses the core issue of music production. In the previous section, the
underlying assumption was that file sharing could reduce the incentives
to produce music, leading to the underproduction of music. The differen-
tiated product market model strongly suggests that (without file sharing)
there is substantial overproduction of music. Could it be that file sharing
has a positive effect on music production, not by helping to create more
music, but rather by reducing excess entry? If this is the case, the adop-
tion of DRM to reduce file sharing may have a negative effect on welfare
by causing music production to inefficiently increase.
To answer this question, I extend the model to incorporate the effects
of file sharing. Again, I make simplifying assumptions: customers divide
into those who will never file share and those who will, and the latter do
not find it costly to do so. The two groups are otherwise identical. Those
who file share may displace CD sales, and their perception is that the
downloaded product is a perfect substitute for the CD. Displaced CD
sales correspond to an equivalent loss of revenue to the music producer.
7 4
However, downloaded music results in the same welfare as purchased
music. I do not account for shared files with value to the customer less
72. Bhaskar and To, supra note 1, at 762 (quoting Michael Spence, Product Selection,
Fixed Costs and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 217-18
(1976)).
73. Obviously, the numerical results are for the simple model only, not the fully gener-
alized model of Bhaskar and To.
74. This assumes (incorrectly) that file sharers will not purchase non-CD products such
as concert tickets, memorabilia, etc., and that the music producers lose all revenue from file
sharers. It is straightforward to construct a more general model, which would lead to greater
incentives for entry and increase the ratio of equilibrium to optimal number of artists.
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than the purchase price but more than the marginal cost of zero,75 as my
assumption of price discrimination eliminates that welfare loss. The re-
sult of these two simplifying assumptions is that the maximal welfare
with m artists with file sharing is exactly the same as maximal welfare
with m artists without file sharing, that is, h. However, the operating
profit per artist is reduced with file sharing in proportion to displaced
CDs.
In Appendix A, I derive the market equilibrium number of artists ns
assuming that the fraction A of CD sales is displaced by file sharing. The
ratio of equilibrium to optimal number of artists is:
I
2 < (7)
Clearly, file sharing decreases the excess capacity. But, by how
much? In the following chart, I use the full range of empirical results: A
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For all but the most fanciful estimate of file sharing displacement of
CD sales, excess capacity is still substantial. While file sharing works to
75. This measure of welfare gain is a key issue in Rob & Waldfogel, supra note 39;
including it here would increase welfare and therefore decrease the ratio of equilibrium to
optimal number of artists.
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reduce the excess capacity that results from the differentiated product
market, it is not sufficient to lead to efficient entry. In fact, the actual
story may be worse; as noted above, this model assumes that a customer
that downloads a song or album and does not buy the corresponding CD
also does not buy any fan-related material, such as coffee mugs, T-shirts,
etc. We would expect that some fans would indeed purchase such mate-
rial, which would increase the profitability of music and of entry, relative
to the prediction of the model above.
DRM was introduced as a counter-measure to file sharing, a techno-
logical means to protect copyrighted work and restore incentives76 to
produce music. For all its ills, DRM had the one benefit of ensuring that
artists and recording companies still had incentives to produce music as
before. In light of the results of this section, however, restoring incen-
tives to produce music to pre-file sharing levels actually increases
inefficiency by encouraging excess entry.
I assume that current market trends (as exemplified by iTunes and
Rhapsody) result in DRM mechanisms in which (non-uploading) cus-
tomers do not feel constrained by copying limitations, so their
expectations are fully realized and DRM is not costly to them. Specifi-
cally, I assume that the use of DRM does not reduce welfare. The pricing
of online music and the acceptance of "reasonable" DRM suggests that
the displacement of legitimate CD sales by file sharing will likely be
substantially reduced by DRM. However, the fact that even these "rea-
sonable" DRM mechanisms have been cracked suggests that we may
continue to see some displacement of legitimate sales, but at a reduced
level. The reduction of displacement using DRM may be as little as 50%
or it may be as much as complete elimination. Combining these esti-
mates, a plausible range of displacement of legitimate sales with a
"reasonable" DRM deployed is 0%-20%. Revisiting the graph above, I
conclude that excess capacity with both file sharing and "reasonable"
DRM schemes likely falls between the A = 0.00 and A =0.20 curves.
What is striking about these results is that the current debates about
file sharing, DRM, and the attendant threat of underproduction of music
are overshadowed by the magnitude of excess entry predicted by the
model. Even the worst case equilibrium with the direst predictions of
unrestricted file sharing makes only a modest dent in this excess capac-
ity. While the legal and economic research communities have been
focused on the "headline" issues of file sharing and DRM, we appear to
76. There are no claims that file sharing has actually led to the reduction of music pro-
duction as of this date. The fears of reduced music production are prospective: if file sharing
continues, so goes the story, it will eventually lead to a reduction. This would be an equilib-
rium result which could take some time to be realized.
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have missed the much larger issue of excess entry in differentiated prod-
uct markets such as music.
C. Accounting for Spillovers
The likely presence of positive spillovers from the production of mu-
sic suggests that ceteris paribus the market outcome will result in the
underproduction of music. However, the differentiated product market
equilibrium results in overproduction of music. If we take account of
both the (privately) excess entry of the market together with the possible
underproduction of music due to spillovers, will the result be over- or
under-production of music?
In Appendix A, I derive the welfare maximizing number of artists
nE if the spillover value of music production is E times the private
value. Finally, the ratio of the equilibrium number of artists with file
sharing (adjusted for DRM) losses of A (from equation (6) in Appendix
A) to the welfare maximizing number of artists with spillover E (from
equation (7) in Appendix A) is:
--n: 2((1 2 )1 )] '+ a (9)
nE  o (1+ E)
The ratio of equilibrium to optimum number of artists is plotted be-
low. I show this ratio for file sharing (with "reasonable" DRM)
displacement of A = 0.0 and 0.2, and for spillover E toward the low end
of that estimated for technology spillovers, E = 0.5 and 1.0:
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The possibility of spillovers somewhat mitigates the problem of ex-
cess entry. However, while excess entry is reduced in the presence of
spillovers, optimum or under-production occurs only under optimistic
views of spillovers, pessimistic views of displacement due to file shar-
ing, and a view that customers have "sharp" preferences (a< 1).
Without further evidence or even plausible assumptions to guide us,
I conclude that while excess capacity is a likely outcome, the final an-
swer must await empirical evidence.
III. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
The model provides guidance as to what evidence we should be
looking for. Empirical work thus far has focused on measuring displaced
CD sales due to file sharing, and determining how DRM may affect that.
However, the above chart suggests that these two variables are of lesser
importance in determining whether or not music is to be under- or over-
produced. Far more important are the shape of customer preferences
over the music product space and the existence and size of music spill-
overs. Unfortunately, it would appear that these variables are the least
likely to be easily measured. For example, economists have worked for
over twenty years estimating the spillovers in technology using patent
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data.7' But, there is no similarly rich and available data set for content
creation, and no reason to suspect that spillover measurement for crea-
tive works would be any easier. In particular, the literature on
technological spillovers has benefited from a readily available data
source: patents. There is no obvious data source for creative works.
Nevertheless, the rich history of dealing with estimation problems in
measuring technological spillovers may help in measuring spillovers in
creative works. But, the empirical problems are still daunting.
I also note that measuring the shape of customer preferences in a
spatial model in which the relevant artist characteristics are unobserved
presents a significant empirical challenge. Steven Berry has authored the
foundation paper for discrete choice estimation with unobserved charac-
teristics. 79 This Article develops a method of inverting a mapping from
mean utility levels to market shares under certain conditions, permitting
(when inversion is possible) recovery of the mean utilities from market
share data. Relevant characteristics may be recoverable using instrumen-
tal variables. However, this approach appears to be dependent upon
uniform pricing and exogenous artists; Berry is quite clear that his ap-
proach is unlikely to generalize to endogenous location decisions, which
are the crux of the model of this Article.
There are many papers that estimate demand with observed charac-
teristics; an early paper is Bresnahan (1987). 0 More recent work
includes Cohen and Mazzeo (2004),8 which estimates demand for banks
with geographic location and other measurable characteristics of banks.
Another is Netz and Taylor (2002),82 which estimates demand for gaso-
line retailers using location data and other observed characteristics of gas
stations. Pinkse and Slade (2004) 83 analyze the United Kingdom beer
market based on observed characteristics; they formally incorporate un-
observed characteristics by including a random variable that they assume
(problematically) is mean independent of the observed characteristics
77. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 54.
78. See generally, id.
79. Steven Berry, Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Product Differentiation, 25
RAND J. ECON. 242 (1994).
80. Tim Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry:
the 1955 Price War, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 457 (1987).
81. Andrew Cohen & Michael Mazzeo, Competition, Product Differentiation
and Quality Provision: An Empirical Equilibrium Analysis of Bank Branching Decisions,
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES 2004-46 (2004),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200446/200446pap.pdf
82. Janet Netz & Beck Taylor, Maximum or Minimum Differentiation? Location Pat-
terns of Retail Outlets, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 162, 162-75 (2002).
83. Joris Pinkse & Margaret E. Slade, Mergers, Brand Competition, and the Price of a
Pint, 48 EUR. ECON. REV. 617-43 (2004).
Fall 20061
104 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 13:77
and is uncorrelated with prices, thus finessing the problem of estimating
unobserved characteristics.
Closest in spirit to the model of this Article is Goettler and Shachar
(2001),' who estimate a spatial model of television programs in the U.S.,
using microdata on 3,286 individual viewers over a one-week period in
1992 from Nielson Media Research. They are able to identify the attrib-
ute space, product locations in this space, and the distribution of
customer preferences. This problem bears at least some resemblance to
the music market, and the variables they are able to identify and estimate
are similar to those required to estimate the model of this Article. They
use maximum simulated likelihood estimation, coupled with methods
designed to improve simulation performance. On the basis of the work
of Goettler and Shachar, it appears that estimation of the model in this
Article is possible in principle. Development of an appropriate microdata
set and the empirical methods necessary to estimate the model awaits
further research.
The old saw concerning the person looking for her lost watch under-
neath the street lamp because the light is so much better there is perhaps
relevant. The model of this Article suggests that we have been looking
under the streetlight (file sharing and DRM), but, if we wish to find the
important results, we must return to the middle of the block (shape of
preferences and spillovers), where it is very dark. I leave this as a chal-
lenge to my empirically oriented colleagues.
IV. CAVEATS AND CAUTIONS
The surprising nature of the results of the model invites very close
scrutiny of the application of the model to the problem at hand, as well
as the plausibility of the range of estimates of file sharing losses (A) and
spillovers (E). I make no effort to defend the latter; plausibility is cer-
tainly in the eye of the beholder, and these estimates appear to me to be
plausible. The reader is invited to make her own judgments, and explore
the implications using equation (9).
The suitability of this particular model to the music market is more
amenable to analysis. There are several levels at which questions can be
raised:
Is a differentiated products spatial model appropriate to the mu-
sic market? Applying a spatial model on the music market
appears intuitive and plausible, but it comes at a cost of impos-
84. Ronald L. Goettler & Ron Shachar, Spatial Competition in the Network Television
Industry, 32 RAND J. ECON. 624-656 (2001).
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ing restrictions on demand interactions. The power of the model
to incorporate both demand and supply conditions in a rich con-
text that appears to conform to our (or at least my) intuition of
how the market works seems persuasive.
Does the model generalize to something more realistic? The
model of this Article has only a single dimensional product
space, customers purchase only a single unit, and preferences
are symmetric and identical up to location. Price discrimination,
free entry, and artists' ability to modify their location are as-
sumed. Bhaskar and To present a much more general and richer
spatial model, and find that as long as price discrimination, free
entry, and artist flexibility hold, excess capacity is the result. The
numerical results of this Article only encompass the simpler
model; a similar analysis of the more general model awaits fur-
ther research.
Do artists price discriminate and are they flexible in their loca-
tion in the face of new entry? These are the most important
assumptions that drive the excess entry result. If either is false,
then the results as derived do not hold. In this Article, I assert
that the appropriate unit of analysis is the artist. In this view, art-
ists and their music producers have a wide range of services and
products that allow fans to express their intensity of preference.
The ability to price these services, as discussed in the text, is, in
fact, the ability to price discriminate. 8 The arguments of Appen-
dix B on both the availability of instruments of price
discrimination and the theoretical limits of how closely perfect
price discrimination can be approximated seem compelling to
me; the reader will have to decide for herself. Other authors
(e.g., Rob and Waldfoge186) have taken the CD as the unit of
market analysis and assert that no price discrimination can oc-
cur. Clearly, the CD is the physical product that shows up on the
music store rack, and is the unit of the transaction. However,
simple observation suggests that fans are loyal to and interested
in artists, and recording firms invest heavily in developing and
promoting artists. The focus on the artist as the product in the
music business suggests a similar focus in the model.
85. The most well known treatment of price discrimination in the context of informa-
tion goods is CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES (1998).
86. Rob & Waldfogel, supra note 39.
Fall 12006]
106 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 13:77
The ability of artists to shift their location in response to market
forces appears to be fairly obvious.87 Pop and country singers of-
ten evolve their music in response to market demands,88 and even
symphony orchestras can make marginal changes in their market
position. If, however, we take the view that the CD is the unit of
analysis, then obviously the CD is what it is and cannot change
in response to market demands. But, as I note above, the appro-
priate focus is on the artist rather than the CD.
Are there spillovers from musical works and what is their magni-
tude? This is the most problematic issue of this Article; there is
no research suggesting these spillovers exist or are important.
While it seems plausible that such spillovers might exist, it is
impossible to tell whether or not they are important. My use of
an estimate range of E = 0.5 to 1.0 seems very optimistic; it
could easily be much smaller. Unfortunately, estimating the
magnitude of these spillovers promises to be a daunting task, at
least as difficult as the estimation of technological spillovers. Yet
it appears that the magnitude of the spillover is likely an impor-
tant determinant of the optimal level of music production.
A broader issue is whether or not the model of this Article proves too
much. If there is overproduction of music, then why not overproduction
of movies, books, videogames, and perhaps other industries? In fact, the
potential inefficiency of entry in spatially differentiated markets has been
recognized since the earliest work by Hotelling. 9 In general, whether
there is too little or too much entry depends on a number of factors; in
this model, the ability to price discriminate (as well as the other assump-
tions) leads to excessive entry. Models of markets with uniform prices
may lead to either too much or too little entry. In one of the few empiri-
cal papers addressing this issue, Berry and Waldfogel apply a
differentiated product model to radio stations in the U.S., estimating that
87. In a recent interview, Liz Phair spoke of her musical shift since her early albums
and her fans' unhappiness at that move, saying, "If you are an old fan and [my new album]
doesn't fit what you need, don't buy the disc." David Carr, The Independence of Liz Phair, N.
Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005 at El, E7.
88. Some obvious cases in point: Britney Spears has evolved her music from "bubble
gum" music targeted at 13-year-old girls to a more mainline pop style as she herself has grown
older. Madonna appears to change with every new album. On the other hand, it is unlikely that
the Rolling Stones can ever change their particular location in music space; their long history
playing a particular kind of music suggests a sunk cost in their location choice.
89. Hotelling, supra note 7, at 49-54.
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excess entry results in a 40% loss of social welfare. 9° This suggests that
many spatially differentiated markets may be subject to the type of inef-
ficiencies highlighted in this Article. On the other hand, there are few
industries with the ability to create such enthusiasm among its customers
(in the form of "fans") and to be able to capture that enthusiasm (i.e.,
surplus) through the sale of complementary goods. It seems unlikely that
movies or books, for example, offer the same opportunities for price dis-
crimination as popular music, and so the results of this model may not
apply to these industries.
There are many open questions about the modeling approach of this
Article and consequently, about the results. Careful scrutiny of the model
suggests a need for future theoretical and empirical work to ensure that
its application to the music market yields credible results.
CONCLUSION
The turmoil in the music industry due to P2P file sharing has at-
tracted scholarly attention in both economics and the law. The primary
issue has been the extent to which file sharing (with or without DRM)
displaces CD sales, with the focus on welfare changes due to (inter alia)
reduced music production. In this Article, I introduce a differentiated
product model of the music market, and find that the form of the market
induces excess entry in equilibrium. File sharing, to the extent it reduces
profits from music production, reduces this excess entry, but not to the
efficient level. A "reasonable" DRM mechanism would increase entry
(by making file sharing less attractive), but that simply makes matters
worse. I then consider the possibility of spillovers from music produc-
tion, which would be expected to drive a wedge between private and
social benefits. Indeed, accounting for possible spillovers reduces entry
closer to the efficient level, but only if the spillover is relatively large and
customer preferences are "sharp." Thus, while the previous literature was
concerned with sales displacement due to file sharing and the attendant
concern of underproduction of music, this Article suggests that the over-
production of music resulting from the structure of the music market is a
much more serious issue. Empirically, the efficiency of entry is princi-
pally determined by the shape of customer preferences and the size of
(potential) spillovers; the effect of file sharing and DRM is relatively
small in comparison.
90. Steven Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broad-
casting, 30 RAND J. ECON. 397 (1999). The authors also point out that similar industries such
as software, television, and print media may suffer the same fate of excess entry.
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The implications for empirical research are clear but daunting. Both
the magnitude of spillovers and the shape of customer preferences pre-
sent substantial measurement difficulties. The Goettler and Shachar 9'
paper offers a way forward, and estimation of the model of this Article
presents a fresh challenge to my empirically oriented colleagues.
91. Goettler & Shacar, supra note 84.
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APPENDIX A
Derivation of Market Equilibrium: Base Case
With n artists in the market, the operating profit of artist a for the
general transport functionf is
" = f 'mn f(I j-x1)-f(Ia-xI)dx=- ff(1-)-f(-z)dz (1)
using the change of variable x = i + (z-1)/n.
Under the power function assumption, profit for each artist (includ-
ing the actual artist and the music firm representing the artist) is
2b 2b__- 1) (2)
n +l (+] a+ 2 a + 1)na+,
With fixed cost of F, the free entry zero profit equilibrium results in
n* artists, satisfying
F -12b (I - or n* =+ 2= 2a 1
F-(a+ 1)n-' 2 ( (a+ lOF (a+)-. F- 2 a (3)
which fully characterizes the equilibrium.
Social welfare W is
W =U -2n n(Wz) dz -nF= - (a+1)2 -nF
Welfare is maximized at hi artists, satisfying
dW a b
dn (a+ 1) 2a
(a + 1)- F- 2a(4)
If the free entry equilibrium resulted in the welfare-maximizing
number of artists, then the ratio n*/h would be unity. Unfortunately,
such is not the case:
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- (21 (5)
na
Note that this ratio depends only on the shape of the transport func-
tion, determined by a; but for all oathe ratio is greater than unity.
Market Equilibrium with File Sharing
Denote the fraction of CD sales displaced by file sharing as A; if the
fraction A of revenue is lost to file sharing, then the number of artists
that enter is
S (a+)-F.2 ) (6)
Welfare Maximization with Spillovers
Denote the value of the spillover as a fraction of the private value of
the artist's music by E. Then total welfare including spillovers with n








The assumption of perfect price discrimination is impossible to real-
ize in practice (as is any "perfection"). The question is whether or not
the actual price discrimination that occurs in the real world is close
enough to perfect price discrimination that the model is valid. In the case
of music, it is tempting to view the product as the CD that the customers
buys from any number of retailers; in this view, music is a pure com-
modity and a single price should be the rule. The view of this Article is
that the appropriate unit of analysis is the artist, not the CD. Artists and
music distribution companies can market and sell a range of complemen-
tary products to music customers that can differentially capture the
surplus that the artist generates among fans of varying enthusiasm. Such
complementary products include coffee mugs, T-shirts, posters, and hats,
as well as fan clubs (with varying degrees of commitment and price for
access to the artist) and even cosmetics lines. Customers who derive lit-
tle benefit from an artist may purchase her CD in the remainder bin at
Wal-Mart for very little money. Those who are bigger fans may purchase
the CD and perhaps a camisole with the artist's picture. Even bigger fans
may join the fan club and purchase hats, T-shirts, and yoga pants. More
rabid fans can also purchase clocks, key chains, buttons, and baby-doll
shirts. The artist and music distribution firms use these ancillary prod-
ucts as a means of price discrimination; each possible bundle of ancillary






For expositional ease, only a single artist is represented, and a linear
transport function is assumed. Each vertical column represents a bundle
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of complementary goods, such as the bundle {poster, rhinestone cami-
sole, hat, DVD}. The base of the column measures the location
space/customers that buy this bundle, and the height of the column
measures the profits from this bundle. In the Figure, seven bundles are
represented (symmetric around the ideal point).
How good is the approximation of the area under the columns to the
area under the curve itself? If the approximation is close, then we can
conclude that perfect price discrimination is a reasonable assumption; if
not, then the assumption is not a good one.
If there are n bundles (columns in the Figure), then the error in ap-
proximating the area under the actual curve with the sum of the areas in
the columns is given by the formula92
M (b - a)24n2
where M is an upper bound on the derivative of the function being
approximated and [a,b] is the interval over which the integral is taken.
Shifting the origin to the ideal point (so the location space is [-/2,+ ])
and normalizing U to unity, the right-hand side function is
I
1-fita, t E [O,6 = [a,b]. Over this interval, its derivative is maxi-
mized at the end point (for a> 1), so M = afio. The integral itself is
1-ft'dt =#--L ( ). Therefore, the error as a fraction of the
a+l
integral is = . This function is increasing in fl, but 8. is con-
248- an2
strained by the assumption that the preference function is defined only
over the unit interval, so f 1/ . For any a; the error fraction is
a+l
maximized at 6 = 2 , max error -2
2 (a similar derivation applies
for a< 1).
For a in the range [. 1, 10] used above, the maximum error with 10
bundles (columns) is less than 1%. For 7 bundles, the maximum error is
1.8%. In either case, the case for a close approximation to perfect price
discrimination with 7-10 bundles is very strong.
92. The reader familiar with calculus will recognize the summation of columns as Rie-
mann sums; as the number of approximating columns approaches infinity, the Riemann sums
approach the area under the curve, i.e., the definite integral of the function. This approxima-
tion can be found in standard calculus texts or at http://archives.math.utk.edu/
visual.calculus/4/approx.2/index.html.
File Sharing, Copyright
Do real artists offer as many as 10 bundles? A check of the Britney
Spears' online store reveals 40 individual items for sale, not including
her extensive line of cosmetics, and not including individual CDs. The
number of bundles of these 40 items numbers in the thousands, suggest-
ing price discrimination based on a musical artist is very good indeed.
This analysis suggests that a well-designed set of products comple-
mentary to an artist's music can capture over 98% of the available
surplus. I demonstrate that the music industry has sufficient instruments
at its command to capture this surplus, in principle. The analysis does
not, of course, constitute an empirical demonstration that the music in-
dustry actually achieves this. It could well be that the complementary
goods and services are not sufficiently valuable to customers and fans to
capture all or most of the consumer surplus. Alternatively, it could well
be that the consumer surplus can be captured, but the music industry is
not clever enough to design goods and services that can do the job. It
would be surprising if a mature industry with sophisticated players sell-
ing to enthusiastic fans/customers was unable to capitalize on the tools
available to them to extract economic rents. However, my result is lim-
ited to a theoretical showing of the rent extraction possibilities.
Some readers might note that the revenues from the sale of coffee
mugs, T-shirts, etc., go to the artists and not to the music distributors. In
the model of this Article, the division of rents between artist and dis-
tributors is irrelevant; between them, almost all available rents are
extracted and the division among the upstream players does not matter.
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